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Rules of Inference

The Stoics are accredited by historians of logic who did the early work on the nature and the theory of conditionals (in which Chrysippus, Diodorus Cronus, and Philo of Megara can further be distinguished). In Diogenes Laertius or Sextus Empiricus, one can find and read the first inscriptions related to this matter.
According to the Stoic logicians, the first kind of indemonstrable statements is as follows:

If the first, then the second; but the first; therefore the second.
We call this basic argument form as modus ponendo ponens, in abbreviation modus ponens, the mood that by affirming affirms.
The second kind of indemonstrable statements of the Stoics is:
If the first, then the second; but the second is not; therefore the first is not.
This basic argument form is called as modus tollendo tollens, in abbreviation modus tollens, the mood that by denying denies.

A contextless inference which "looks like" a counter-example to modus tollens:

(1) If it rained, it didn't rain hard.
(2) It rained hard.
(3) So, it didn't rain.
If such a conversation occurs in our everyday lives, the person who uttered (1) will not say (3), after learning (2) from his/her friend related to the current situation outside. The inferences which are similar to the above are criticized in a lot of books about logic.


next up previous
Next: Axiom Schemata Up: lecture Previous: Schemata
Computing Science 2002-07-01